Governance and the Market for Corporate Control
By John L. Teall


Governance and the Market for Corporate Control

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Governance and the Market for Corporate Control
By: John L. Teall 
Abington, UK: Routledge Publishers , 2007 
ISBN: 0-415-39786-3 
288 pages, Hard Cover 
HD2741.T43 2006 
338.6 - dc22


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ABOUT THE BOOK

From The Publisher
Governance and the Market for Corporate Control is a textbook for use on business courses dealing with mergers, acquisitions, governance restructuring and corporate control. 

Three key features distinguish this book from competing texts. First, following up on recent developments in the corporate arena, it places a heavy emphasis on managerial compensation, incentives and corporate performance. Second, its conciseness allows for flexibility of use. Third, its coverage is broad and examines many topics including: 

  • significant discussions of corporate governance
  • power and voting
  • managerial compensation
  • takeovers
  • going private transactions
  • corporate restructuring
  • event study methodology. 
As well as combining theoretical, empirical, quantitative and practitioner-oriented matter, the material in this key book provides the academic foundation necessary to ensure students’ understanding of important concepts.
 

Reviews
 'This lucid and comprehensive text provides an in depth view and analysis of the many facets of corporate governance and its importance for business efficiency and wealth distribution in the U.S., Europe and the rest of the world. It is based on good theory, yet its contents have great practical relevance for managers, board members, legislators and any one with a stake in a firm. Corporate Governance and the Market for Corporate Control is an ideal textbook for business and economics students since it presents a rich and captivating assortment of applications, examples and short case studies carefully illustrating the most important and most relevant issues affecting the governance and control of business firms around the world.' 
Clas Wihlborg, Professor of Finance and Director, Center for Law, Economics and Financial Institutions, Copenhagen Business School

'Corporate Governance and the Market for Corporate Control offers an engaging and comprehensive overview of corporate governance in the modern global economy. This timely exposition is highly readable and includes intuitive discussions of theory and modeling along with numerous case examples. The book is well written and highly recommended for professional and popular readership as well as for university classroom use, both at MBA and undergraduate levels. '
Kose John
Charles William Gerstenberg Professor of Banking and Finance
Leonard N. Stern School of Business Administration, New York University

'Dr. Teall has done an admirable job distilling the essential concepts, problems and theories of corporate control into a single concise and accessible volume. Topics in this well organized text range from the theory of the firm and corporate acquisitions to power, voting, abuses and excesses of managerial entrenchment and compensation policy.
Theories and models are explained clearly in this book, as are empirical and computational methodologies. Discussions on the economic impacts of M&A activity, compensation policy and organizational structures are fascinating and important reading material for business, law and economics students at all levels.'
Iftekhar Hasan, Cary L. Wellington Professor of Finance, Lally School of Management and Technology, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute

 

Preface
 

I.    An Introduction to the Market for Corporate Control 
A.    An Introduction to the Theory of the Firm
B.    What is the Market for Corporate Control?
C.    Corporate Objectives and the Agency Problem
D.    Jensen, Meckling, Monitoring and Bonding
E.    Corporate Ownership Structure
F.    Alternative Governance Systems
              Japanese Governance, Ownership Structure and the Keiretsu
              The Economic Cooperative
        Discussion Questions
                Appendix 1.A: The Prisoner’s Dilemma

II.    Corporate Boards, Power and Voting
    A.    The Corporate Charter and Bylaws
    B.    Boards and Board Structure
                 The German Two-Tier Board Structure
                 Board Committees
    C.    Voting, Proxies and Proxy Raids 
    D.    Power Indices
    E.     Valuing Votes
    F.     Cumulative vs. Majority Voting
    G.     Share Classes and Recapitalizations
                 Synthesizing Votes
                 Sotheby’s and Single Class Unification
        Exercises
        Exercise Solutions

III.    Managerial Compensation, Shareholdings and Performance
   A.    Summary Statistics
   B.    The Structure of CEO Compensation
               Valuing Managerial Stock Options
               Unwinding Equity Incentives
               Deferred Compensation
   C.    Determinants of Managerial Compensation
               Non-CEO Executive Compensation
   D.      The Board and Compensation Decisions
   E.    Managerial Compensation and Performance
   F.    Managerial Shareholdings and Entrenchment
             Death of the CEO
   G.    Is Management Compensation Really Excessive?
       Exercises
       Exercise Solutions
        Appendix 3.A: A Primer on Option Pricing
           Put-Call Parity
        Appendix 3.B: Adjusting Managerial Stock Options for Dilution

IV.        Corporate Takeovers
A.    Motives for Takeovers
            Value Creation Through Improved Operations or Enhanced Revenues
            Wealth Transfers
             Managerialism
B.     The Co-Insurance Effect
C.     Cross-Border Takeovers: Motivations and Complications
              China Construction Bank: Strategic Alliance with Bank of America
D.    Forms of Takeovers
E.    History of Takeovers
F.    The Merger Wave in Europe
               Example: Takeovers in the European Banking Industry
               Example: Effects of the European Bank Merger Wave on Local Banks
G.    The Managerial Role in the Takeover
               Takeover Defenses
H.    Law and Regulation of Takeover Activity 
              Antitrust Laws
              European Antitrust Law
              Securities Law
              State Regulation
              Industry-Specific Regulation: The U.S. Banking Industry
I.     Accounting and Taxation for Takeover Activity
      Exercises
      Exercise Solutions
             Appendix 4.A: 1997 Merger Guidelines
                  Purpose, Underlying Policy Assumptions and Overview
                  Market Definition, Measurement and Concentration
                  The Potential Adverse Competitive Effects of Mergers
                  Entry Analysis
                  Efficiencies 
             Appendix B: Mergers Exceeding $13 Billion Through 2003
 

V.         Takeover Valuation
A.    Introduction
B.    The Comparables Approach
C.    The NPV Approaches
             Takeover Valuation: Illustration
D.    Multi-Stage Growth Models
             Application: The 2004 Vodafone Takeover Bid for AT&T Wireless
E.    Valuing the Cross-Border Takeover
             Cross-Border Takeover: Illustration
F.    Setting the Discount Rate
             Cost of Capital: Illustration
G.    The Certainty Equivalence Model and Real Options
             Example: The Takeover and New Product Development
H.    Real Options Analysis and Takeovers
              Real Options Analysis: Asset Abandonment Option Example 
              Real Options Analysis: The Coinsurance Effect
              Takeovers and Coinsurance Options Positions: An Example
I.     Defensive Acquisitions and Bidding
        Exercises
        Exercise Solutions

VI.    Going Private and Other Control Transactions
A.    Leveraged Buyouts (LBOs)
B.    Management Buyouts (MBOs)
              Example: MBO of Aescia from German Chemical Giant BASF
C.    Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs)
D.    Master Limited Partnerships (MLPs)
E.    Spin Offs, Asset Divestitures and Tracking Stock

VII.    Event Study Methodology
A.    Event Studies
B.    Normal and Abnormal Returns
               Example: Event Study Methodology
       References
       Exercises
       Exercise Solutions
               Appendix 7.A: A Brief Review of Elementary Statistics
                  Mean, Variance and Standard Deviation
                  Co-Movement Statistics
                  A Brief Review of Hypothesis Testing
                  Hypothesis Testing: Two Populations
                  Introduction to the Simple OLS Regression

VIII.    Empirical Evidence on Takeover Activity
A.    Takeover Returns: A Summary
B.    Post-Merger Firm Performance: Combined Firm Results
C.    Target Firm Returns
D.    Acquiring Firm Returns
E.    Merger Effects on Bonds
F.    Going Private, Divestiture and ESOP Transactions
G.    Managerial Motives for Mergers
H.    Takeover Legislation and Regulation
I.      Proxy Contests

IX.    Corporate Governance Failures
A.    Effective Corporate Governance
B.    Corporate Kleptocracy and Cooking the Books in America
C.    Rotten to the Core and Asleep at the Wheel
             Example: The Parmalat Meltdown
             Example: The Skandia Scandal
D.     Cleaning up the Mess

Glossary
Endnotes 
References 
Index  
 
 


 


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updated 08/24/07